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documents as old as some of these, so the readers’ indulgence is requested for
some of the anomalies that remain despite our best efforts to clean them up.
Everything published from 1912-present is available on the School’s website
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in the Series requires copyright permission for reproduction when intended
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MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT:
THE ECOLOGICAL LIMITS OF OPTIMISMl

INTRODUCTION

by
Fran~ois

Mergen

Dean and Pinchot Professor of Forestry
Yale School of Forestry

T IS A distinct honor for me to introduce to you the lecture series on tcMan
and His Environment: The Ecological Limits of Optimism." This series
is based on presentations by members of the Yale Forestry School Faculty at
the Thirteenth Annual Yale Alumni Seminar held at New Haven June 10-13,
1969' This is the first time that the faculty from the Yale School of Forestry
was invited to participate in these seminars. One might be puzzled by the fact
that members of a forestry school faculty show interest and competence in this
subject. Although the Forestry School still devotes substantial energy to specialized problems related to forest management and forest administration, our
programs have expanded to include many aspects of man's environment. The
goal of our School is to provide a center within Yale University where students
can learn to deal with natural resource problems on either a specialized or generalized level. Further, the aim is for all faculty members to view their specialities as elements in broader biological and social systems and to give this
perspective to the students.
We consider our activities in their broadest sense as being concerned with
the scientific and long-term management of biological ecosystems for human
benefit. Successful natural resource management consequently requires understanding of both the ecosystem and the socio-economic system so that forest and
related land use can be placed on a sound and enduring basis enabling our
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society to use and yet maintain our rich heritage of natural resources. In so
doing, the School has both contributed to and benefited from the growing
national concern for the environmental problems that theaten the quality and
the existence of human life.
With increased population and industrialization in the years since World
War II, the despoilation of natural resources has become apparent to politicians
as well as to conservationists. The field of ecology provides an inclusive and
logically consistent structure for perceiving the world we live in and it also
attempts to account for the behavior of man within the world structure.
The first lecture asks the question tcHow Many People?" It was presented
by Professor Richard S. Miller. Professor Miller is a native of Cleveland, Ohio
and is a graduate of the University of Colorado and Oxford University, where
he received a D. Phil. in 195 I. He has served as an instructor at Harvard
University, an Associate Biologist at Colorado State University, as an Assistant
and Associate Professor at the University of Saskatchewan, and since 1967 has
been Professor- of Wildlife Ecology at the Yale School of Forestry. He currently holds the Oastler Chair in Wildlife Ecology.
Professor Miller is the author of numerous research publications and was a
recipient of a Fulbright Scholarship to Oxford University, the Phi Sigma
Award of the University of Colorado, and he has been working under research
grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Research Council
of Canada and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is well known
internationally for his contributions to action programs in environmental management.
In his paper Professor Miller considers some of the advantages that modern
technology has produced for the quality of human life. In so doing technology
has created a spectrum of environmental problems that is leading to serious
deterioration of the total human environment. Because of the demands by rapidly expanding populations for more and more of the material benefits of
technology, and because of the large demands that a technological society places
on the world's natural resources, we are faced with the need to arrive at an
optimum size of human population through effective planning and population
goals. Without such a decision, we must inevitably expect serious deterioration
in the quality of human environments.
The second paper was prepared by Dr. George M. Wood~ell on "What
Level of Life?" Dr. Woodwell is a native of Cambridge, Massachusetts and
he is a Lecturer in Forest Ecology at the Yale School of Forestry and Senior

Ecologist at Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island. He holds an A.B.
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lemma." Professor Jordan was born in Oakland, California and was educated
at the University of California where he received his B.A. and Ph.D. degree
in 1955 and 1967 respectively. He is presently Assistant Professor of Wildlife
Ecology and he has served on the faculties of the University of California at
Berkeley and at Purdue University. He is well known for his research work
on the ecology of moose and wolves in Isle Royale.
Professor Means is a native of Detroit, Michigan and he was a Visiting Lecturer in Forest Sociology at our School during the 1968 -69 academic year. He
is now Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Kalamazoo College in Michigan. Professor Means holds degrees from Kalamazoo College, the
Colgate Rochester Divinity School and Cornell University, where he received
his Ph.!? in 1964. He has served as Associate Congregational Chaplain at Cornell University.
He has published articles dealing with Sociology, Biology and History.
Professor Jordan delivered the lecture that deals with the fact that ecologists
are becoming increasingly presumptuous in public pronouncements on matters
of economics, engineering, law, pOlitics, sociology and moral philosophy. Although the ecologists neither claim specialized competence nor seek professional involvement in these areas, they see' the evidence and implications of
a deteriorating relationship between man and his environment and find that
experts in human affairs are apparently unaware or unconcerned about this deterioration. In order to transpose ecological issues into socio-economic terms,
it is helpful to define the system in which thought and action must take
place. This is attempted with a multi-dimensional interaction matrix of human
ecology.

4

HOW MANY PEOPLE?
Richard S. Miller
Yale School of Forestry
INTRODUCTION

N 1798 Thomas Robert Malthus published the first of seven editions of his
nEssay on the Principle of Population." This famous or infamous work,
depending on your political philosophy, was written in opposition to the political-economic schools of mercantilism and revolutionary utopianism that were
current at that time, but it also provided the beginning of modern population
theory and, in fact, gave Charles Darwin a major clue to his now famous principle of natural selection. It was a prime tenet of mercantilist theory that nations
can only benefit at the cost of others, and that a state should hoard both gold
and people to increase its economic, political and military power. The French
philosophers of the 18th cenhiry retained this notion, as many countries do
today, that strong states need large populations and that the misery of people
is the result of social institutions and can never be produced by over-population.
Saint-Just stated that nature can be depended on nnever to have more children than teats" and that it was the function of the state to maintain high
levels of population growth. He, therefore, advocated not only that marriage
should be encouraged by state loans, but also that couples who do not produce
children within seven years after marriage should be forcibly separated and
the Republican government later introduced differential taxation, so that single
persons over 30 years old paid 25% more taxes and legislation was enacted
against celibacy. To varying degrees these attitudes, along with corresponding
legislation and taxation, are still widespread throughout the world today; incentives to population growth are regarded as keys to economic prosperity and
political strength. I would suggest that we need to re-examine some of these
ideas.
In spite of the many misinterpretations and denunciations of Malthus' essay,
it was nan inquiry concerning the improvement of society", in which he stated
that one great impediment in Ctthe progress of mankind toward happiness"

I
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is "the constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it." In other words, Malthus asserted that there is a tendency
for human populations to increase at a geometric rate while their means of
subsistance, mainly food production, can only increase at an arithmetic rate.
Many of the. objections to Malthus' statements were due to his emphasis on
man's biological nature. He was· severely attacked by many contemporary
clergymen as atheistic and immoral, and the clergymen preferred to accept
Martin Luther's adage that "God makes children and he will also nourish
them. " Yet, in spite of the emotional outbursts of critics as far apart in philosophy as the clergy on one hand and Karl Marx on the other, the fact remains
that Malthus' principle of population is an integral part of demographic theory
and man, whether he likes it or not, is subject to the same laws of population
growth that govern all species of plants and animals. The question, therefore,
is not so much whether man is an animal- he is - but whether he chooses
to govern his behavior in such a way as to use his higher intelligence and the
benefits of a cultural history.
LAWS OF POPULATION GROWTH

The rate of growth of a population is determined by the ratio of births to
deaths in the population. In human populations this rate is usually expressed
as the Mean Annual Growth Rate (M.A.G.R.) and is based on the number
of births and deaths per thousand individuals. Thus, the world birth rate in
1968 was .34 per thousand and the death rate was 14 per thousand, so that
the rate of population growth was:
34 - 14
M.A.G.R.% ==-.- == 2.0%
1000

Change in population size is, therefore, the product of the rate of population
growth and the number of individuals in the population, and when there are
no constraints on the growth rate the result is an exponential, or geometric
increase. This is the form of population growth we would expect in an unlimited environment. For example, a bacteria may divide to produce 2 individuals, which in 20 minutes may themselves divide to produce 4 individuals,
and so on. At this rate, there would be a colony of bacteria one foot deep over
the entire face of the earth in a day and a half; an hour later the colony would
be over our heads; and in a few thousand years would weigh as much as the
visible universe and would be expanding at the speed of light! As ludicrous
as this kind of proj ection may seem, it does establish two points: ( I) the
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potential for increase in animal populations is extremely high and (2) the
fact that such increases are not realized is because all organisms live in limited
environments where external constraints are placed on population size.
If, instead of calculating these kinds of theoretical projections, we observe
the growth of a natural population in a limited environment, we find that population growth tends to follow an S-shaped curve. The increase in population
size is slow at first, because of the small number of individuals in the initial
population, but becomes more rapid as numbers increase. However, as the population size begins to approach its environmental limit, the rate of increase
sIows until it eventually reaches zero and there is a balance between births and
deaths. Thus, for any population and environment, there is a limit to the
number of individuals that can be sustained on the resources that are available,
and this is referred to as the Hcarrying capacity" of the environment for that
population. These are fundamental properties of all natural populations and
environments, and since infinite population growth is impossible, a population
has two alternatives available for self-regulation of its numbers in relation to
the ultimate carrying capacity of the environment: ( I) the birth rate has to
decrease or (2) the death rate has to increase, until these two values are in
balance.
HUMAN POPULATION

How do these basic laws of population growth apply to man? First, we must
acknowledge that we live in a finite environment and, even though we do not
yet know its numerical value, there is a limit to the number of people the world
can support. Secondly, for any value we establish as the carrying capacity of
the earth for human populations, there will be a definite quality of life associated with it. It is conceivable, for example, that we could cover much of the
earth with skyscrapers and feed its people on tablets containing essential nutrients and energy, but would this constitute a satisfactory quality of life?
Finally, we must decide whether our population growth and its ultimate level
of numbers will be planned or unplanned - whether we will let birth rates
and death rates and the density of human populations find their own levels,
as in most animal populations, or whether we will use our intelligence and
resources to produce a more ethical solution that preserves human values.
Table I shows a selection of population statistics for the world and for two
contrasting sets of nations and regions. In 1968, the population of the world
was estimated to be slightly less than 3.5 billion people and on the basis of a
rate of population growth of 2.0 per cent, we can also estimate the world will
7
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world food production, all goods and services, schools, transportation facilities,
etc. just to maintain the present standard of living, which is even now inadequate in many areas. This may be a relatively easy task for East Germany,
where the rate of population increase is only 0.5 per cent and the population
doubling time is 139 years, but Latin America, with a doubling time of 24
years, faces an extremely dismal future. Poverty and malnutrition are already
widespread, the agricultural potential of the tropics is low, the population projection is one of increasing, rather than decreasing growth rates, and the political instability of most of Latin America makes it unlikely that effective
population and social planning will be instituted in time to avoid disaster.
Optimists who are not alarmed by world population growth point out that
population projections are often wrong. This is quite correct; most projections
of future population size have been wrong, but the error has almost been on
the conservative side by way of underestimates. Table 2 gives examples of some
population projections for the U.S. and the world. In 193 6 Pearl and Gould
estimated that the population of the world would level off at 2.6 billion by the
year 2100; today the world has already reached a population of 3.5 billion with
a projection of 6.6 billion by the year 2000, and there is no indication, whatever, of a decrease in rate of population growth toward a constant population
size. Similarly, Pearl and Reed (19 20 ) predicted that the population of the
United States would reach a constant size of 197 million by the year 2100 and
Pearl, Reed and Kish (1940) later predicted a level of 184 million by the
same date. The population of the United States today is 201 million, again
with no levelling off in sight. The basic reason for the error in these population
projections is that they assumed that the rate of population growth would soon
begin to decrease when, in fact, as shown in Table 3, the mean annual growth
rate has consistently increased throughout the history of world population
growth. All of the available evidence indicates that this trend will continue
until, by the year 2000, the world population growth rate will be 3.4 per cent
with a doubling time of only about 20 years!
It is also argued that the world population problem is not numbers of people, but how they are distributed throughout the regions of the world. This
argument is partly correct, in that poverty and malnutrition tend to be most
acute in regions of high population increase, but there is small comfort in this
correlation. Immigration policies are dictated by national interest and not by a
desire to house and feed uThe wretched refuse of your teeming shore." The
immigration laws of most uhave" nations discriminate against the uhave-nots"
on the basis of job skills or country of origin, and there is no evidence to sug-
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is that death rates are relatively easy to control, and their control is socially
acceptable and desirable in modern society, while birth rates are more difficult
to influence. The absolute maximum longevity of humans has not changed
significantly in historical time and is still about 110 to 120 years. We occassionally read of someone celebrating his I I oth birthday surrounded by several
generations of offspring, and are usually treated to a discourse on how to live
past 100. These prescriptions for longevity vary from wholesome food and
ttclean living" to strong whiskey and black cigars but, in either event, it is
obvious that modern science has not created a new biological race of long-lived
people, and it is doubtful that it will. However, we have been able to modify
the human environment and improve health conditions sufficiently to increase
the average life expectancy considerably. The average life expectancy of man
from Neanderthal until the last century was probably about 25 years, but it is
now 70 years in many advanced countries and the world average is 53 years
(Table I). The major sources of human mortality have shifted from diseases
of infancy and middle years to those of old age, and it is highly unlikely that
communicable diseases will ever again play ,a major role such as the Black
Death of 1348 . Infant mortality is especially easy to control with modern medicine. In 1900 the infant mortality rate in the United States was 143 per
thousand, but by 1968 it was down to only 23 per thousand. However, when
mortality rates are drastically reduced without a corresponding reduction in
birth rates, a population explosion must inevitably follow. Thus, the high rates
of population growth (Table I) and the poverty and malnutrition that now
exist in Africa, Asia and Latin America will become even more explosive as
the death rates of these areas are reduced to values more nearly comparable to
those in more advanced countries.
THE CASE OF JAPAN

A popular cause for optimism is ((The Case of Japan", where remarkable
progress was made in reducing the birth rate in a relatively short period of
time. When the Tokugawa dynasty was established after several civil wars,
there followed a long period of peace, during which Japan was essentially a
closed population system with no emigration or immigration. During this
period, all adults except Sumari and their servants had to be registered at
the temples every six years. From the data provided by these registrations,
we know that the population of Japan grew rapidly at first, but after 1720 it
stabilized and remained more or less constant, as an agrarian society, for over
a century. With the spread of the industrial revolution from Europe to Japan
12
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grown so rapidly that malnutrition and starvation are more widespread in Egypt
now than when the dam was begun.
In 1949 William Vogt wrote in his book etRoad to Survival" that the curves
of environmental deterioration and population increase have long since crossed,
and that unless man readjusts his way of living, in its fullest sense, to the
imperative posed by the limited resources of his environment - we may as well
give up all hope of continuing civilized life." Vogfs arguments were severely
criticized and were countered by optimistic agriculturalists who predicted that
the solution to the world's food problems was just around the corner. They
seemed to feel then, as many do now, that supposedly insignificant amounts of
environmental pollution can be tolerated and that an expanding population is
essential to economic growth. Today we have the bloated bellies of the children of Biafra, and even malnutrition and starvation in the United States, to
remind us that William Vogt was not entirely wrong in his predictions. The
agricultural abundance that was optimistically forecast by Vogfs critics has
still not caught up with the world population and, in spite of some temporary
gains in the recent past through the opening of new lands to agriculture and
the use of fertilizers, is beginning to fall farther and farther behind. I think
we can also agree that the quality of the human environment is in many ways
worse, not better, than it was in 1949. We have reached a point where the
atmosphere and entire lakes and river systems are so seriously polluted that
they have become environmental catastrophes. In many cases, environmental
pollution has already placed a limit on the use of critical human resources.
We are, in fact, well into an environmental crisis compounded of the forces
of population growth and environmental deterioration, and this equation will
not reach a happy solution without considerable effort and re-planning of the
human environment and, unfortunately, a good deal more human misery.
It seems painfully evident that there is an urgent need of broad national
policies' on human environment which include a recognition of the need for
population control. Such policies will require drastic revisions in attitude and
in national and international priorities. We will have to learn to recognize the
facts and the dangers of unlimited population growth, and the need to adjust
our economic and social policies to a constant population size, without contrasting unlimited population growth, on the one hand, with bizarre schemes
of infanticide or estrogen in our drinking water as the only other alternative.
Nor can we continue to give credence to the argument that population control
is an affront to human dignity - there is very little dignity to starvation. We
may also question whether our present social institutions and political systems
tt

16

HOW MANY PEOPLE?
are adequate to deal with today's problems - they are slow and cumbersome
and a local constituency or regional need may not necessarily represent the
national interest, especially with respect to some of the more urgent problems
of human environment. Nevertheless, the alternative does not have to be anarchy. There are undoubtedly solutions which have yet to be explored, and at
the very least we must acknowledge that human population growth is a problem
that requires our immediate attention and a more generous allocation of our
resources.
Our current expenditures on research on pollution control in the United
States are roughly equivalent to what it costs to run the Pentagon for 2 1/2
hours. It costs more to fly two B5 2 bombing runs in Viet Nam than we spend
annually on population research. It would, of course, be naive to argue that
every dollar cut from the military budget could then be directly applied to
population research, but it is also evident that our present system of priorities
leaves a lot to be desired. We are, quite simply, a crisis-oriented society. We
are willing to spend vast sums to achieve what appear to be relatively simple,
immediate objectives such as building an atomic bomb, putting a man on the
moon, or stopping «the spread of Communism", but we are reluctant to put
an equal effort into long-term goals with deferred consequences, no matter
how important they may be. We respond more readily to riot and violence
than we do to logic and reason, so that we let inequity persist until it explodes.
However, we may be facing a crisis of unprecedented proportions which is
relatively subtle in its development but far more disastrous in its consequences
than anything in the history of man, and the future quality of the human
environment and possibly our future on this earth will require realistic intellectual and economic commitments to meaningful long-term goals of population and environment which insure a satisfactory and equitable solution of the
human environmental equation of numbers and resources.
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WHAT LEVEL OF LIFE?*
G. M. Woodwell
Yale School of Forestry and
Biology Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory,
Upton, New York 11973

S

CIENTISTS and academicians in general usually try to avoid words like
Hcrisis" believing that they prejudice thoughtful analysis with a demand
for decision and action. But scientists, too, attach a sense of urgency to environmental problems these days, having watched them grow in this decade to
dimensions that even the most conservative among us agree demand decision
and action. But what decisions and what actions? Should we stop producing
people? oil? cars? pesticides? ghettoes? students? How should we do these
things? There are answers, of course, many of them, too many of them. Answers that by their numbers alone make them more of an aggravation than a
palliative, and even when they are good, often more palliative than cure.
Building new cities for the new millions sounds attractive and is consistent with
the American Dream, but it doesn't solve the problem of today's cities. And
it's today's cities that are burning, promising that tomorrow's millions, bred
in today's cities, will only make the fires hotter, throwing in not the gymnasium
at CCNY but the library at Yale. And while it may seem far-fetched to connect
the wrecking of the universities to the environmental crisis, there's a strong
belief among ecologists that the two are .more closely connected than we might
at first guess. Surely the fact that there are many Cassandras today, and many in
high places, has a dominating influence on philosophy and on human activities.
Fortunately, all the Cassandras can't be right; unfortunately, only one need be
right. Small wonder that the young question the institutions of their fathers ...
and that scientists acknowledge that environment is in crisis.

*Research carried out at Brookhaven National Laboratory under the auspices of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission.
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I want to step back a few paces to gain a perspective of the broad dimensions
of the set of problems that make the Environmental Crisis. I propose to back
away from the myriad cures and deliberately to simplify the issues in an attempt
to lay the context of the crisis bare. In proportion as we succeed in sharpening
our view of the context, then planning and specific solutions become real possibilities. Otherwise we tend to be driven as now by competing cures for immediate crises, not by plan.
Having accepted the burden of simplification and opened myself to all of
the beads that can be drawn on one who tries such a rash trick, it's tempting to
go the whole course and lay it all to a single factor. But ecologists have learned
otherwise: there are a few single factor systems in real life. We can't simply
say it's all due to population, nor all due to technology, nor all due to failures
in government. It's not, but these are the issues: numbers of people, resources
and the rules that relate people and resources.
There are a few these days who will argue that density of population, simply
numbers of people, is not a central issue in the environmental crisis. The Paddocks, the Days, Paul Ehrlich, Richard Miller, and others have made the
exponential curve of population growth newspaper jargon. Doubling times for
population appear weekly these days in the Times ... with pleas that Government do something toward developing a policy on population. It's common
knowledge that we can expect the present 3.5 billions of the world to approach
7 billions by the year 2000. In the wealthy part of the world, in the industrialized countries, the doubling time for the population is longer, but still
only about twice that for the world as a whole or about 65 years. Thus while
the wealthy nations are not experiencing the same growth rates and by dint
of their technology and wealth are better able to handle the increase and even
to slow it, their populations are still doubling within a few decades - and
their welfare cannot be separated from that of the poorer nations that have
the highest growth rates and can be expected to be churned by a growing series
of crises as their populations increase.
The implications of the present rates of growth of population are almost
incomprehensible - and will lead in a time that is short, within our own lives
or the lives of our children now living, to results that would be absurd if they
did not have such tragic implications. The only question is: what will stop
this growth? Will the limit be Malthusian? Food? Or something else? If so,
what?
Other conspicuous possibilities are three: first, by plan, evolved through
deliberate action by society; second, by a wave of -personal choice generated by
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personal attitudes, ethnic groups - they are powerful economic forces, some
of the same forces that drive our technology and provide the riches of the
industrialized nations.
It rem~ins to be seen whether the optimists are correct in their assertions
that population in the industrialized states will become stabilized without some
form of moral or political persuasion as advocated by Garrett Hardin and
others. The evidence that it will is feeble; the forces against it are strong.
These points are· clear:
1. Doubling times for population in the United States and in most other
countries of the world is of the order of decades, even in the industrialized
nations. Such growth rates are very rapid.
2. The operating assumption of the industrialized countries is that some
mystical force, a product of the free enterprise system, perhaps a gadget, will
somehow restrict population growth to some level that will assure continuance
of high standards of living. The evidence for the emergence of this control
is small, but as we have seen, changes come rapidly these days.
3. Within broad limits, social problems increase with the number of contacts
between people. The number of contacts is increased by: (a) the number of
people; (b) by urbanization, an accentuating pattern in the industrialized
nations; (c) by technology, which increases each person's command of resources. A man who has a car obviously takes up more space, uses more air
and other resources and has a greater opportunity to interact with other people
than the man who walks.
And this brings me to a consideration of my main topic, resources.
Resources are, of course, almost infinitely numerous and complex. For simplicity I choose at the moment to overlook the complexities, including technology with all its versatility in providing new resources and to consider only
air, water and land. These basic resources exist with certain qualities that are
essential for life as we know it. Air is approximately 80% nitrogen, 20% oxygen and .03% CO 2 • Water is fresh or salt, clean or dirty, rich or poor in
mineral elements. And land, too, exists with a wide range of qualities.
The qualities of air, water and land have in surprising degree been shaped
by living systems, living systems that have the remarkable capacity of evolving into an ever better fit in an environment that they build as they evolve.
Here we have a strange, continually evolving, feed-back system, with changes
in environment caused by biological evolution bringing further evolution to
exploit the changed environment, the whole process occurring over perhaps
4.5 billion years or so. The result is the world we know, with its present
21
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qualities of air, water and land; its present temperature, its- present capacity
to reradiate solar energy, to fix carbon and to regenerate oxygen into the air.
Perhaps if we were patient enough, we could identify a list of essential resources, essential to support life as we know it, essential to continuance of the
earth's present level of life. High on the list would be those I've mentioned.
We might call the systems that control these factors: Life Support Systems,
borrowing on a popular and appropriate analogy started apparently by
Barbara Ward's splendid title CtSpaceship Earth."
Let's look at these life-support systems. We say, somewhat glibly, that they
are the product of biological evolution spanning some billions of years. Without attempting to recapitulate the year-by-year account, it seems fair to say
that the general tendency of evolution appears to be a continuing division of
resources among an ever-increasing number of different kinds of users. Each
kind of user is what we call a species. Thus, the evolution of living systems
is toward diversity in form and function, toward increased complexity as represented by increased numbers of species that become a part of the resources of
the system and thereby aid its evolution. Biological evolution is a continuing,
self-augmenting process, feeding on itself and adding to itself, building-in
ever more complex ways of exploiting resources to sustain life.
Clearly, the numbers of organisms, the sizes of populations and their fluctuations in numbers are not random. They a,re controlled. But how? And of what
importance is it?
There are many ways of examining the structure of natural communities.
One of the most useful is on the basis of energy distribution: their structure
seems to be governed by what one might call Ctthe 10% law." About 10%
of the energy entering any trophic level is available for transfer to the next
trophic level. Thus 10% of the energy fixed by the plants is available to herbivores' and 10% of the energy entering the herbivores is available to the first
level of carnivores and so on. Clearly, on the basis of energy exchange alone
there are quantitative relationships between trophic levels and any disturbance
of one of these affects the others.
This is a small glimpse of the living syst~ms that have built the biosphere,
and we ask now to what extent the biosphere remains dependent on the integrity of these life-support systems. The best answer is that we don't know.
We do know, however, that:
I. Such systems, natural communities or natural ecosystems, have dominated
the earth for all of time. Their occurrence and their effects on the biosphere
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technologists, supported by industry and by government have successfully maintained for twenty-three years that DDT is a threat neither to man nor to nature.
As a result, we seem committed to drastic changes in the earth's biota, some of
which are certainly irreversible. There is little chance of recovering the strains
of the peregrine falcon that once nested in the northeastern United States, for
instance. There is, nonetheless, reason for hope that the persistent pesticides
will be dropped, outlawed for use in the out-of-doors, perhaps soon.
We are experiencing now the confrontation between technology and environment, and technology is having to yield, the broader costs of the ccmiracle"
pest control techniques finally, after twenty-three years, having been proved
almost to the point of defeating even the powerful alliance of business, industry
and government that has supported them so effectively. But there are many
other threats - hardly less serious than the pesticides or the SST: there are
now PCB's, the polychlorinated biphenyls, a product of the plastics industry.
There are also beryllium from rocket fuels, lead, CO, S-compounds, and others,
unknown and uncontrolled.
These points are clear:
I. The biotic resources of the earth are no longer large in proportion to the
demands man is making on them.
2. Demands on resources, biotic and abiotic, increase with the development
of technology. Technology increases the fraction of the earth's resources commanded by an individual. This means that an individual takes up more space
on earth if he has technology.
3. Technology increases competition or interference between people, increasing the need for manners or laws regulating behavior.
4. Technology, too, is increasing on an exponential curve. We can measure
its doubling time on the basis of the use of fossil fuel, variously estimated as
doubling every fifteen to twenty years. Consumption of fossil fuels is only
loosely coupled to the increase in population and can be considered a crude
measure of the extension of technology.
Clearly, the environmental crisis is due not simply to increase in numbers of
people nor simply to the increase in technology, but to the product of these
two exponential curves: population with a doubling time of decades and technology with a doubling time approaching one decade. The doubling time of
the environmental crisis is thus measured not in decades but in years.
The environmental crisis is real, an enduring phenomenon, not simply due
to population growth but also due to the growth of technology, a technology
that is malignant in the sense that it develops its own resources, adding to its
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treat him as a head of state or astronaut and garbage will be converted to
humus and electricity will turn salt water into fresh water. How can we help
but believe that nuclear fission offers him: "Power seemingly without end.
Power to do everything man is destined to do. We have found what might
be called perpetual youth ... and like children ... will have the hope and exuberance of boundless energy." And given options on symbolic· futures - the
vanishing arcadias of intellectuals or the Westinghouse. utopias of perpetual
youth - who can deny everyman's inevitable choice? If we wish to understand
the origins or environmental problems we must enter such a metaphorical
tangle. We need to realize that our images do indeed tell us what we are.
And rather than quarreling with our images we should quarrel with ourselves.
We should realize that we deserve and get the kinds of glory and despair
which are our New York Cities and Hudson Rivers.
We should first note that, though miracles lIl:ay be promised by the technocrats at Westinghouse and her benevolent corporate sisters, these miracles
are of an entirely different nature than the gifts from a son of God. The
sincere efforts to surround corporate behavior with an aura of sacredness or
calls for the defense of "peoples' capitalism" against all other sources of plenty,
falter on their own lack of faith. For one thing, modern miracles of technocracy, unlike religion, only speak to us about the magnitude of gain rather
than the magnitude of loss. Because our expectations are so structured we
know that to sacrifice in the name of God is something quite different than
sacrificing self in the name of General Motors or the People's Bureau of
Transportation.
The loaves and fishes were sacred miracles universally in-tune with the bulk
of human history, where myth and ritual soothed man's awareness of vast
unknown and unknowable forces. Even science, as Toulmin and Goodfield
(19 65) argue, has spent the largest share of its history attempting to document those miracles already held by sacred authority. In our times the scientific investigation of God's grand design is no longer a guiding faith.
Today, whether in a capitalist or a communist social system, technology is
the secular substitute for sacred miracles. Rationality, equality, individualism
and materialism are the songs of our contemporary miracles rather than the
arcadian virtues of passion, nobility, community and spiritual faith. In Max
Weber's words, we are no longer enchanted with the world. Weber (19 19)
suggests that the modern man has little knowledge of his tools nor even the
need to understand how these or the basic necessities of survival are produced.
He argues that:
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The savage knows what he does in order to get his daily food and which in·
stitutions serve him in this pursuit. The increasing intellectualization and
rationalization do not, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge
of the conditions under which one lives. It means something else, namely, the
knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it at any time.
Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces
that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by
calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer
have recourse to magical means in order to master or explore the spirits, as did
the savage, for whom mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calcula·
tions perform the service.

Though the Madison Avenues of the world offer an unrequited stream of
magic where motor cars bring virility, scented creams bring beauty, and carcinogenic smoke brings sophistication, still we know that in those higher glass
towers are pygmies just like us. In this sense we have brought the world down
to our scale. It is ours. It is as fallible, petty and glorious as we are. Yet we
suspect that like us, the fishes and loaves of technology are tainted. When
men not gods make miracles, the good works always contain the seeds of
human terror and it is a terror all the more frightening because we feel we
should understand it. Thus rationality tends to become the most terrifying of
irrationalities. Though Weber, as Marx, applauded the triumph of rationalism
over the superstition of the middle ages, Weber, (19 0 4/ 195 8 ) unlike Marx,
saw in the triumph of rationalism the seeds of its own destruction.
No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end
of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will
be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last
stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: cSpecialists
without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it· has
attained a level of civilization never before achieved:

In Captain Ahab, Melville gave us a poetic view of the world Weber feared,
where all the means are sane, the motive and object mad. The international
weapons culture would seem to have long surpassed the insane rationality
of Ahab.
As Richard Barnet suggests in a recent issue of Science (19 68 ), ttThe accusation that the military mind lacks imagination is absurd, as readers of Air
Force / Space Digest and its army and navy counterparts can testify. The
threats that leap up from the pages of these journals are equalled in inspiration
only by the reassuring panoply of instruments they recommend to burn, shock,
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bore, disintegrate, poison, or blow apart those who dare to pose such threats.
The logic of the arms race is utterly imperturbable; totally conflicting signals
from the enemy produce the same results. In each case the analysis of the external political and military environment is different; in each case the prescription is the same: More."
But then the trained incapacity of the military has so wandered into the
realm of heroism and tough mindedness that it is closer to poetry and therefore
not an apt case. Better examples are furnished by conservation agencies.
Ashley Schiff (19 62 ) documents how the U.S. Forest Service became so
committed to preventing fires in the forest that it suppressed all empirical
evidence as to the value of burning for timber stand improvement. It hasn't
been until recent years, and then still reluctantly, that the Forest Service
and the Park Service have recognized fire as a valuable silvicultural tool in
preserving the health of redwoods and certain pine species. Thus present practice seems but a delayed recognition that the non-professional unlettered
southern farmers at least had their empirical observations, if not their techniques in better control than the rational professionals.
Similarly, Charles Reich (19 62 ) and others have argued that technicians
in the Forest Service have so tied their interest to timber values that they have
been unable to consider other uses of forests, such as recreation. Such trained
incapacity is not a monopoly of the Forest Service. In a careful study of the
TVA, Phillip Selznick (1949) documents how an organization founded in
the name of conservation became so co-opted by dominant commercial interests
that conservation has become less and less a guiding principle.
We could continue to list examples where regulatory agencies have gradually grown to reflect the views of the ind~stries they were intended to regulate
because survival of organizational rationality supersedes the value of the originally passionate goals. Or we could note the interesting competitions which
occur when the Bureau of Reclamation is draining marshes for more agriculture
while the Fish and Wildlife Service is attempting to save marshes for migratory wildlife, and the Department of Agriculture is paying for soil banks.
However, my intent is not to join in the now familiar and often misguided
condemnation of bureaucracy. Rather what I am suggesting is that problems
of the environment, as other social problems, are fed by the same forces which
create the hopes and rewards of social life. By disenchanting ourselves, by
rationalizing the world, we have created institutions competent to feed millions
far beyond the expectations of Malthus, and to be equally competent in processing millions for gas chambers or sacrificing many more millions in games
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international alliance - even, we are told, messages from the outer galactic
nights. Every joy and sorrow, triumph and defeat in the kingdom of man is
prepared for our emotional consumption. We ingest. We wait. The hair style
of a rather expensive London prostitute or the wisdom of four young men
from Live-rpool crowd out the affair of the local grocer and distract us from
the events of control to the events beyond our control. Moral outrage seeins a
cheap price to pay for avoiding action. While our internationalized information furnishes an easy, inflationary coin which keeps our homely discourse
running, it soon bores and is further devalued. It matters not.· For a thousand
and one new names and places and events are waiting to slide through our
mouths never to be heard from again.
In a sense it is progress for it lifts us from the trivia of our provincial
lives and certainly there seems positive good in rising expectations. Yet by
lifting our eyes we also increase our sense of powerlessness. We cannot impose sanctions directly upon the pesticide user, as we can upon the miscreant
in our local village. We can encourage the mystique of law and lawyers to
enforce their complex metaphysic, but the complexity has removed· our sense
of touch and of participation. Our souls are not with us, nor our bodies and
barely our minds. The laws will come and they will corrupt our souls for their
enactment will likely lead to unforeseen and unpleasant consequences which
will require more mystique in the higher rhetoric of law and we are specialized
out of it.
As exotic wars, and international monetary crises rise and fall we are spectators at events beyond reality, yet whose consequences have the greatest consequence for our personal' survival. Information about the problem seems real,
yet the problem itself seems unreal for it is beyond the range of our comprehension and control and we suspect it is likewise the same for the experts.
And we feel that all the ~educational' programs in the world will merely give
us more information but no knowledge. We simply endure like passengers in
a jet airplane who have all sorts of information about territories they are
passing, elevations, speed, and those funny noises in the engine, but their
very life support system seems beyond them.
In a pre-television study of the mass media, Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert
Merton (1948 ) suggested that tCthe flood of information may serve to narcotize rather than to energize the average reader or listener." They reason as
follows:
As an increasing meed of time is devoted to reading and listening, a decreasing
share is available for organized action. The individual reads accounts of issues
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continuity. The consequence is that junk, not progress, is our most important
product.
Auto graveyards stretch across thousands of acres of the Western· World,
and Detroit in a fit of conscience may develop an equivalent of the Nobel Prize
for the inventor of the super-car-eater. Yet our surfeit of junk is far overshadowed by the accelerating birthrates of machines and, perhaps, Presidential
commissions and engineering committees to solve solid and fluid waste
problems. Still our admiration for the new machines leaves us scarcely time
for a parting tear, much less a thought about our accumulating mountains of
technological junk. And if technology got us into this mess surely it will get
us out. Yet at those rare interstices of contemplation we must vaguely sense
that the junkpiles are symbolic of our times, like middens for future archaeologists, they speak to the future, meanings we do not clearly hear.
We do not hear because the minstrels of rationality loudly praise the accumulating waste of our times as proof that we are on the verge of reaching the
apex of democracy - never have so many had so much to waste. Apparently
waste is the new definition of democracy. A writer in the New York Times
(Carthew, 1969) recently reported that often in Moscow there is a deliberate
jamming of traffic so that the Russians can feel as suitably decadent and
democratically successful as the West.
It is well to note such Russian inventiveness, for it may control our tendency
to expand patriotic sentiments to include the notion that no society in the
world can waste like the Americans with the inference that this is due to some
sort of superior quality of American society or for the alarmists, some sort of
superior demented quality. Nevertheless a boast that none could be as despicable as us', like the boast, none could be as great as us', have equally chauvinistic· origins. We had best keep such matters straight. The world probably
finds the praise of our faults as tiresome as the praise of our successes. Anyway when it comes to waste we have no specifically greater innate capacities.
The historical and ethnographic records offer fairly clear evidence that from
the noble savage on through the arcadian Greeks, until the industrial order,
excess and waste has been a characteristic of all human societies. The periodic
gluttony of tribal feasts of the potlatch ceremonies where the magnitude of
prestige is determined by the magnitude of possessions destroyed, suggest that
scarcity and difficult survival conditions are no guarantee of efficiency in use
or conservation of resources. But then as the Yerkes (19 2 9) suggest, this is
little different from our primate cousins. They say, HAll of the anthropoids
are careless eaters which in their haste to satisfy their appetite destroy and
C

C
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nomics will persist far into the future, that fail safe tactics, and ballistic missile checks are perfected and eternal. Yet all of these seem the height of
absurdity, if anything the margins of error are diminishing. We find that
anti-pollutant muffiers on autos in the Los Angeles area are not accomplishing
the goal of smog free desert air, for the population growth of automobiles
continues its explosion so that though individual autos are now cleaner, the
increased number of autos maintains the high levels of emission. We stand
poised, as the racing car driver who has converted danger into routine, yet
find that the routinization of terror is the quickest route to death. No more
than smog is cleared with cheap and simple technological manipulations is
peace waged with orwellian slogans while fragile humans guide their missiles.
This, of course, is the choice we are given ... to continue in the same way
and destroy ourselves, or to transform ourselves so that we no longer continue
in the same way. I state this extremely for we need to fully view the social
implications of what the ecologists direly remind us. If we must be concerned
with population explosions of human beings, let us be even more concerned
with the population explosions of automobiles, missiles and the other bedrock junk of our industrial growth. To point at the automobile and war industries is to consider the two most significant providers of jobs, living standards, mobility and adman eroticism in industrial societies, it is also to point
at two of the least important and least significant activities yet invented by
man. There is no crucial need to make sure Americans, Russians, Chinese or
whomever are killed 10 times over, nor is there any survival need to speed
through 10 national parks in 5 days. These are old, almost trite issues and
given our passion for the new, they merely arouse impotent yawns rather than
crusading zeal. Yet, I bring these dead issues up once again to illustrate the
limitations of our alleged moral concern for the environment.
Since 1948 various peace movements have been storming the Pentagon and
planners have been shaking their heads in horror over Los Angeles. The environmental crisis was just as close in 1948 as now, yet the autos continue to
proliferate and the missiles to spread their tips in the face of all reason, logic
and humane desire. We seem unwilling to recognize the reality of society in
that we assume that individuals playa full share in its direction, while ignoring
the chains of social development which bind all individuals to the programmed
decisions made in collective triviality and doubt. Decisions of motorized cities
and sophisticated weaponry start from hopeful and mistaken assumptions, soon
acquire the virtue of tradition and the weight of vested routine. When caught
in the tangle of good ideas routinized into bad events the traditional American
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solution has been to run off for some new uncontaminated territory. The
clean prairie occupied only by migratory tribesmen, or the valleys and mountains settled by technologically weak locals were inviting settings for ignoring
the mess left behind and getting the next social experiment started; for recouping losses, for dispersing second and third sons. It was the new beginning.
Colonialism has that crisp virtue of starting afresh and it is a virtue not to
pass lightly into the rhetoric of the new left without an awareness as to how
much colonial values are essentially part of the new left. For the goal of
taking old institutions and indiscriminately scrapping them is not much different than creating automobiles for profit and leaving their inherent problems
for others to clean up.
The origins of these attitudes seem best accounted for by two events: I) the
transformation of European feudal society into a market economy; and 2) the
European's discovery of a frontier. We will first consider Karl Polanyi's (1944)
discussion of the causes and consequences of the developing market economy
and then we will consider the frontier. Polanyi argues that in antiquity and
feudal times the great mass of men made no separation of economy from
society. Within the feudal community men had reciprocal rights and obligations
towards one another, and, though avarice was by no means absent, moneymaking was a marginal rather than a central life interest.
The market society was a completely new social form which, he says, involved teno less a transformation than that of the natural and human substance
of society into commodities." Later he argues,
The crucial point is this: labor, land, and money are essential elements of
industry; they also must be organized in markets; in fact, these markets form
an absolutely vital part of the economic system. But labor, land, and money
are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is bought and
sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them.
In other words, according to the empirical definition of a commodity they are
not commodities. Labor is only another name for a human activity which goes
with life itself, which in turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different
reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or
mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is not produced by
man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power which, as
a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of
banking or state finance. None of them is produced for sale. The commodity
description of labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious.

He notes that the consequences of establishing a social order upon such
fictions were grave.
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To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings
and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity <labor power' cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even
left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be
the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man's labor power
the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and
moral entity <man' attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of
cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social
exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice,
perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements,
neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the
market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate busi!ness enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous
to business as floods and droughts in primitive sociery. Undoubtedly labor,
land, and money markets are essential to a market economy. But no society
could stand the effects of such a system of crude fictions even for the shortest
stretch of time unless its human and natural substance as well as its business
organization was protected against the ravages of this satanic mill.

However, countervailing forces to escape from the satanic mill were largely
meliorative modification rather than fundamental change. Perhaps, fundamental thange was avoided because, as Walter Prescott Webb (I95 I ) argues,
Eurqpean civilization is only now coming down from a 4 00 year frontier boom.
He suggests that when the European looked out from the Middle Ages and
discQvered a world populated by indigenous peoples whose religion and technological means of warfare made them imminently exploitable, then the frontier ,for Metropolitan Europe opened. And with such discovery came the
wonders and wealth which we attribute to our own ingenuity and institutions.
Webb suggests we too quickly congratulate ourselves.
He notes that: . . .
,in I500 the Metropolis had a population of IOO million people crowded
into an area of 3,750,000 miles. The population density for the entire Metropolis was 26.7 persons per square mile. For each person there was available
about twenty-four acres, a ratio that changed little from I300 to I650. The
opening of the frontier upset the whole situation by destroying the balance
that had been struck between land and man. A land excess of nearly 20 million
square miles became available to the same number of people reducing population density to less than five, increasing the average area per individual to
I48 acres instead of 24.
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expansionist ideas were Martin Luther King's Montgomery association "who
talked about the here and now rather than Kansas or Bust, or New York or
Chicago. And what they really won was respect for themselves as men who
no longer ran away. The frontier never had and never could give a man that
kind of self-respect."
I believe Williams concentrates his attention on the U.S. because we have
been the last to discover the finiteness of the world. And also, though he
might deny it, because America still represents one of the best hopes for self
transformation.
Yet every indication is that we have not come to terms with our loss of the
frontier. We are promised expansion in space or science while advisory commissions to the President seriously recommend ignoring our old cities and
starting clean and fresh with 110 new cities. Both historians would argue
that the search for such new frontiers are simply distractions. The vast human
and technical organization for the life support of astronauts precludes any
opportunity for participation by the masses such as was offered by the first
frontier. While the higher mystique of science seems the antithesis rather
than the frontier for mass freedom, equality and capitalism. As Webb suggests:
I should like to make it clear that mankind is really searching for a new
frontier which we once had and did not prize, and the longer we had it, the
less we valued it; but now that we have lost it, we have a great pain in the
heart, and we are always trying to get it back again. (yet) . . . there is no
new frontier in sight comparable in magnitude or importance to the one that
is lost. If the frontier is gone, we should have the courage and honesty to
recognize the fact, cease to cry for what we have lost, and devote our energy
to finding the solutions to the problems now facing a frontierless society.

To transform our market metaphors and to relinquish our frontier hopes
so that we may discover ourselves will not be easy. In the remaining time I
wish to examine a concrete case to illustrate something of the necessary difficulty and to suggest what will be required of the leadership class and its
society in resolving environmental problems.
III
I will deal with the population explosion since we are told that it is the
major source for all our environmental crises - from riots in the streets to
hunger abroad. And since. concern over population explosions, like conservation, seems to unite men of the deviant left and men of the established right.
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wine barrels of Roman Aristocracy) and suggest that the best solution for the
underprivileged is to let the elites destroy themselves through environmental
destruction. Vnder these conditions, the poor who have long adapted to the
norms of adversity are very likely to have the best chance of survival and
therefore ultimate assumption of positions in the hierarchy of the new social
order. Certainly it seems unwise to appeal to minorities such as the New
Zealand Maori or the American Negro to use the vote but not the gun while
at the same time demanding that they limit the numbers. of their future voters.
Persons of the underclass cannot be expected to hold a faith that a limited
consumption world is any more certain a way towards a community of equal
and free men than is a world of relative plenty.
Indeed, there seems considerable delusion in uncritically accepting the population theories of Ricardo and Malthus without realizing that these were
primarily theories for rationalizing exploitation of man and nature by the
market economy. A comparison of the almost stable populations in Europe
and Japan with the former colonial areas or the areas of greatest population
.growth in the V nited States suggests that population explosions are rooted in
hopelessness and that hopelessness is made in the dominant western economic
centers, rather than by some immoral irresponsibility among the underclass.
Such delusions may reflect the fact that the dominant approach to human
reproductive behavior has treated it as a strictly biological phenomenon. There
is a charming desire to get at the real forces in human population growth by
using detailed studies of insects and other non-human species as operative
models of human reproductive behavior. It may be that the size of ant or deer
populations reflect the coinciding patterns of maximum reproduction being
checked by predators, food supplies and disease. Such species do seem to exhibit tendencies toward maximum reproduction. After all, these are populations which exhibit oesteral cycles where reproduction must be crowded
into intensive periods of time. However, primates with a minimized oestral
cycle do not seem to maximize reproduction because the more elaborate social
structure tends to impose reproductive limits rather than maximization. Certainly, Qonhuman species exhibit relatively constant and universal behavior in
regard to that specie's reproductive and mortality behavior. The same simply
does not hold in human populations. Culturally varied human populations
throughout history have practiced equally varied forms of population control
all of which are determined by prevailing mythologies rather than biology.
Men have developed complex marriage, family and sexual institutions, and
thus the transactions between females and males take on quite a different nature
49

MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT
than that of other species driven solely by sexual impulses. Who one is eligible to copulate with, the age, the time, the place are all specific upon the basis
of social norms rather than biology. Certainly, no other species expends such
vast amounts of energy creating works of art in story and picture designed
solely to stimulate a flagging interest in copulation. Man has converted sexual
behavior into an art, with all the normative constraints associated with effective art. To induce changes in his sexual behavior requires a significant rearrangement of his social order.
Thus a pioneering study by Hill, Stycos and Back (1959) indicates that in
Puerto Rico family size is most often influenced by the imagined opinions
of mothers-in-law and the failure by the male-female pair to develop a neutral
vocabulary for discussing sexual decisions. Correspondingly in an earlier period of the United States, women were scarce and highly valued and therefore
future wives were placed upon levels of higher morality. Young men delayed
marriage, not because of ineffective biological drives, but because the prevailing
norms demanded that a man must have a position of security to protect the
more delicate woman. At this time children were both an economic asset and
an announcement about a married couple's success in their relationship. As
families were started later the average age of family completion was later.
Today the average age of first marriage is considerably lower, yet still not at the
biologically optimum point of puberty, while the average age of family completion is much younger.
Further the search for early marriage is not as likely to reflect a rampantly
modern impulse for reproduction, as it is likely to reflect higher living standards, increasing interest in values of companionship, desire for personal
security, escape from parents and other socially directed tcneeds." While the
offspring of these younger couples may be viewed as a conspicuous consumption
far more reflective of higher social status than easy credit material possessions.
In short, I am suggesting that population control requires something much
more than malthusian desires to keep the underclass from overbreeding; nor
do we gain a great deal of understanding by assuming that man's behavior
is analogous to other animals.
A recent Nigerian study by P. o. Olusanya (19 69) indicates the interlocking complexity involved in controlling human population growth. Olusanya
found that two out of three Yoruba women believe sexual intercourse while
nursing harms the mother's milk, therefore frequency of intercourse· is limited
by social beliefs, not biological facts. Social beliefs also determine why the
Yoruba disapprove of any form of birth control beyond abstinence. There is
50

FISHES AND LOAVES
ship class to prepare for a transformation as great as the market society and
the frontier forced upon the feudal lords? Are those in command of our
social system likely to push the levers which, if not sending them to the
underclass, at least deprfves them of their customary range of power and
action?
Perhaps the American revolution is a useful perspective for considering
such questions. It was uniquely a case where the leadership class encouraged,
shaped and .led its people into the unknown of rebellion to transform itself.
To venerate these rebels and ignore their method may be an untimely error.
These are hard days to be an American. It is not easy to have borne the
burden of hope for everyman's dream only to find dreams turned into a nightmare of hate. It is not easy to have stretched toward the manifest destiny only
to be caught on the limits of time, space and ideology. It is not easy to search
for freedom and equality and get an environmental crisis instead. Hopefully
our discovery of the limits to optimism may compel us to take up the problems
at hand and let the future take care of itself. Yet one fears that like the actor
removing his purple robes and still hearing the closing night's applause, we
shall simply reflect upon how short is our turn at playing king, and how
quickly the footlights dim into shadow.
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UR ENVIRONMENTAL dilemma stems from real and growing environmental crises which are caused by man and which threaten all
mankind. To draw together the physical, historical and sociological points
presented earlier in this symposium, a sociologist and an animal ecologist have
naively accepted the challenge to say things which are supposed to be left
to the economist, to the political philosopher, and to the moral philosopher
or theologian. At least the sociologist is not too far afield.
Our environmental dilemma may be thought of as mankind's failure to
recognize and reckon with the things he is doing to his surroundings. Man
is adapted to respond differently to different classes of crises. We show strong
and emotional response to immediate, personally identifiable confrontations
against self or community; we lack such response when the threat is vague
or unidentifiable in personal terms, or is of incomprehensible enormity. For
example, the religions which have, through history, been most successful are
those which transformed vague and incomprehensible issues into contexts men
can indentify. Environmentalists today must put the facts of our environmental
crises into contexts personally identifiable by the citizenry at large. The simultaneous impact upon all of nature of erupting human population and technological manipulations pose a threat which most men do not yet perceive.

O
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It must be recognized that in this era of environmental crises, a major relationship exists between the state of the man-environment inter-action and
the exercise of individual freedom. One is currently witness to a sudden and
massive increase in man's impact upon the surface of the earth, and at the
same time he notes that scientific understanding of ecological processes has
itself increased many fold. The ecological revelations provide now a base from
which national predictions can be made and upon which consequent solutions
can be engineered, if society so chooses.
If a farmer does not recognize soil erosion when he sees it and does not
know of its implications, his farming decisions are not complicated with
questions of soil conservation. When he does learn about erosion, however,
he must choose (whether he wants to or not!) among meaningful alternatives,
the implications of which he understands. He now is free, so to speak, to
decide whether or not to allow °his" soil to wash away.
Our discussion focuses on the United States. A very large part of the
global crisis has been precipitated, unintentionally of course, either .,directly
or indirectly from within the United States. Furthermore, the American colossus is so influential in the world that it is unlikely much change will occur
elsewhere (except in Western Europe) before this nation itself sets the pattern of how its environment can be protected, of how its industrial development
can be stabilized at a safe and optimum level, of how its resources as well
as those of the whole world can be conserved before shortages are felt, and,
most importantly, of how its own population growth can be stopped.
We maintain that never in history has freedom, in its broadest sense, been
so available to so many members of a society as in the United States. We are
not arguing that this availability has been uniform or complete, nor that freedom here has been exercised with consistent responsibility. The broadness of
America's freedom includes, with some exceptions, freedom of practice and
advocation of unpopular or unfamiliar political and religious forms without
fear of legal or economical sanctions. Beyond these are other freedoms, which
~hile not classed as human rights per se, are of immense importance to the
average citizen: choice and ability to move geographically, without suffering
economic deprivation; choice and general ability of education - including
higher education - and of profession; and finally a comparatively strong
ability to move oneself across economic, ethnic, and social barriers. Evidence
of these freedoms is in their exercise; no other society in history has witnessed
such mobility · in space and in economic status, educational or intellectual
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Consider now, for the U.S., the strength of social cohesion, the other side
of Russell's political equation. One might expect that sacrifice of self for the
good of the community would not have been fostered in a young nation of
rugged individualism and uninhibited competition. The frictions of varied
cultural, ethnic, and racial mixings should have engendered individual isolationism and antagonisms; foreign threats did not compel cohesion for defense.
Despite these factors, a strong spirit of cohesiveness, functional and versatile
rather than traditional, did arise; it was engendered by fervored religious
practice, by a common effort to subdue the wilderness, and by the pragmatic
observation that endeavors are often better pursued by group effort. Grassroots
political participation, including cohesion within parties, must have had important reinforcing value. Americans, when joined into armies, have displayed
both the ability to cooperate in imaginative ways and the willingness, without
coercion, to sacrifice self for country. Our people tend to display, sometimes
with simplistic naivety, great pride in their country's accomplishments and
its riches. Despite their traditions of individuality, Americans from the days of
the colonies have been unusually adept at forming cohesive units for functional
needs. Teamwork in our technologically complex society has long amazed
observers from Western Europe.
We hold that when the influential majority of Americans clearly realizes the
portentousness of our environmental crises, they will make personal sacrifices
and will alter their values and life styles as is necessary to preserve the quality
of life and freedom of opportunities. The move to halt environmental degradation and to achieve stability will best be accomplished through the same
freely chosen cooperative processes which have produced the technological
wonders. The awakening is, as we discuss below, now in progress. Its lateness
reflects an information gap plus forceful competition and opposition from
entrenched and insecure economic interests.
At this point the authors ought to pass on their personal estimate of whether
or not today's accelerating environmental crises within the U.S. will be solved
before a drastic decline in living standard, personal freedom, and quality of
life occurs. Citizens can assume one of three attitudes, given that the situation
is . grave: (a) despair or apathy, concluding that there is no social mechanism
for change because of widespread selfishness, ignorance, or apathy; (b) unbridled optimism, having blind faith that American intelligence and technology
(or God) will recognize and solve each problem as necessity dictates; or (c)
guarded optimism, seeing the problems as technologically solvable but requiring concerted effort to bring forth public motivation beforehand. We
stand with the last alternative. We deplore despair (or apathy) in the informed
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person as being irresponsible, and we question the judgment (or commitment)
of those who advise us not to worry. We choose the last because current
crises are developing at such a rapid rate that the probability of solutions being
implemented fast enough to achieve stability is rapidly decreasing. Our optimism is a matter of necessity, since any other outlook is unacceptable; but
beyond this we observe that American responsiveness has in the past met big
challenges. There are actually current signs to reinforce this belief; some
citizens first becoming informed, then concerned, have through their political
action produced striking progress in reversing environmental threats.
To talk of solution requires some definition of the problems. Man's current environmental dilemma is so far-reaching that dozens of volumes are
needed. It defies accurate delineation because virtually every physical activity
or material need in all but the most isolated, truly ttprimitive" societies are
in some sense operative. To delimit the system, we offer a diagramatic scheme
consisting of the three main dimensions: the major components of man's
environmental impact in time and space; the ways in which he understands
and relates these reactions to his own life and that of the community; and
the level of human organization at which concerns and solutions are dealt
with. Figure I illustrates the scheme: each dimension is broken into three
categories giving a 27-cell matrix. Each cell could constitute subject matter
for a chapter in a book on man in his environment. We do not defend our
choice of categories as being the most functional or realistic. We did intend
this in part to meet the claim that today's environmental dilemma is so complex that it defies description, much less analysis.
To illustrate the use of this matrix, apply it to the issue of the internal
combustion engine. Focus first on the individual and consider his understanding, his qualitative evaluations, and his social responsibilities in relation to
this device. The citizen needs to learn of the ecological and physiological
implications of these vehicles - the amounts of non-renewable resources current production requires, the pollution which mining and processing of iron
and petroleum products create, and, of course, the pollution produced from
the engine's operation. Then he should understand what impact the highways
necessary to carry all today's vehicles have on the land and on the cities.
Essential to this understanding is a review of alternatives such as public transportation, rail vs. highway, smaller vehicles, substitutes for the internal combustion engine, and redesign of communities to prevent vehicular traffic
from dominating every phase of life. Next, the individual can weigh the
aesthetic impact of cars on the quality of life in urban areas, with speculations
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to effect such change, given sufficient motivation by the citizenry and willingness on their part to alter personal life styles.
If indeed decisions and motivations within our economy are based, as we
are carefully instructed, upon the demands of a free market, then presumably
the system is not a planned one, and each entrepreneur, as he competes vigorously, is guided primarily by maximization of profits. It appears improbable
that such a system could adapt, within itself, to the wise, long-term allocation
of resources; neither could it be self-restrained in curbing environmental and
public-health perturbations. Led by Milton Friedman, some American economists believe religiously that a free-market approach produces the most healthy
economy, which in turn produces the greatest benefits to society in general.
Friedman aslo implies that the private sector of American business today does
operate essentially as a free-market economy.
Other economists, most prominent among whom is probably John Kenneth
Galbraith, challenge the Friedman school, claiming the widely advertised notion that America's economy is primarily unplanned and subject to free-market
conditions is more myth than fact. Galbraith (19 67) argues that economic
activities here are not extensively planned well in advance but that in successfully so doing, entrepreneurs create and shape their own markets rather than
simply responding to them. Without claiming for ourselves any professional
expertise on these matters, we recognize the direct relevance of such controversy to the environmental dilemma.
Galbraith's thesis claims that no longer does each private unit compete
freely, and no longer is the primary goal of industrial leaders the year-to-year
maximization of profits. He explains that the massiveness and technological
complexity of today's industrial processes necessitates organization of productive units into giant corporations, which are capitalized far beyond the resources
of anyone man or small group of men. The corporations are in effect semipublic institutions. Managing of corporations has become so complex that decision making is spread among many persons: they in turn are not as directly
concerned with current profits as if ownership were in their hands or in the
hands of their immediate superiors. Galbraith refers to these men, with their
diverse skills, as the Utechnostructure." A major portion of resource extraction,
manufacturing, transportation, and utility services in the U.S. today is provided by a relatively few giant corporations. Their management is diffuse, and
their ownership is even more diffuse. Competition within. many industries
is no longer such a critical and unknown variable; it does not as in the past
necessitate day-to-day changes in operations. Long-term planning at all levels
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within corporations and within industries is not only possible but is virtually
essential to permit efficient functioning of the giant concentrations of capital
and human resources.
The decrease in outright competition, the increase in long-term planning,
and the manipulation of the market itself may appear as conspiracies against
treasured traditions. These changes, however, probably result simply from a
maturing of the economy and can be likened to the changes e~ologists identify
in the maturing of a biotic community. Under stable condlitions, biotic communities slowly evolve increasing diversification of specializations and welldeveloped strategies for avoiding competition among the specialists. Production of population surpluses, which are somewhat akin to profits not reinvested, decreases; less of the energy goes into reproduction and more of it
into building up biomass, which can be likened to capital assets. Non-renewable resources (nutrients) are used and recycled more efficiently. The evolved
strategem of each species seems not so much to overwhelm the community
by aggressive competition, but rather to assure itself never-ending participation
in the game. So it is within the technostructure: personal goals motivating
decision makers include more than financial gain; key personnel are motivated
by security and prestigious identification with a big-game concern. In addition
then to their normal responsibility of keeping profit margins favorable, these
men work to enhance the size and the image of their company. Profits of
course cannot lag, but after a reasonable dividend has been paid, there usually
remains a large share to be ploughed back for the increase of size or diversity.
In this growth process, the technostructure maintains considerable control over
future events; hence the role of planning becomes critical, and the fate of these
giant corporations does not rest on the whims of the market or upon totally
unpredictable competition and cost factors.
If one accepts Galbraith's thesis, then he should reexamine the relationship
between industry and environmental dilemmas. First, the oldest of the problems, air and water pollution, may well be solved with an ease which is directly
proportional to the size of the corporation and to its freedom from competitive
pressures. The biggest of firms are those most concerned with image and lease
influenced by the immediacy of a profit margin; public displeasure, when truly
present, will be most effective in eliciting voluntary responses from these big
firms. In contrast, the small marginal firms are unavoidably in for a disproportionate share of inconvenience. The latter, being less concerned with image
and often operating with little or no margin to allow for increased cost, are
the least likely to volunteer pollution control. They are then most subject to
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that such consequences are being brought even-closer under current rates of
economic and population growth. If stability is to replace growth, and if resource cycling is to replace resource waste, and if total social planning is to
replace partial planning for profit, then great changes in social values and
habits are demanded.
We frankly doubt that corporations, as presently guided, can accommodate
to this revolution. However, it appears that these semi-public institutions should
be more adaptable to changes in accord with public interest than would small,
individually owned concerns whose operations are dictated more directly by
profits alone. There exist enough arguments against outright nationalization
of all economic endeavors to justify our trying to find compromises which retain as much private incentive, ingenuity, and reward motive as is practical.
Pragmatically, of course, there are such strong emotional reactions against
socialism in this country that, despite the example of relative success of publicly owned industry in several democratic, industrialized nations, Americans
for the time being cannot be expected to accept any major shift away from
what they consider hallowed ideologies. Should compromises not succeed,
however, the public's interest will demand ever-increasing restriction of the
private sector to counteract threats to environment and resources.
To those who claim that attitudes among corporate leaders will not mesh
with those of society's long-term environmental needs, we raise one question:
what sorts of values are being carried into the corporate technostructure by
the current crop of university graduates? Are radical changes in personal values
and in traditional attitudes towards authority now demonstrated on campus
going to be carried into the business community and eventually change business philosophy in America? The so-called student rebellion represents the
action of more than a Bohemian fringe; participants are numerous, they are
bright and ambitious and seeking power, and they include many children of
current leaders in business. While we do not predict whether or not significant
numbers of the so-called radicals will enter the technostructure, and if so
whether or not they will accomplish major changes, we do believe these questions deserve careful study. Here lies an outstanding possibility for orderly
change in an area which otherwise offers depressing prospects of continued
irresponsibility towards the environmental future of man.
An ethic of stability and conservation in man's economic activities is essentially heretical to the philosophy of American business. The implications of
this fact are best pointed out by one economist, Kenneth Boulding, who,
while highly respected for his general competence, is apparently suspect by
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That size of individual family should be other than sacredly private is
not new. For military security, strength, and other nationalistic purposes,
governments throughout history have urged, subsidized, and coerced couples
into having more children than they might otherwise have chosen. An excellent example was Moscow's persuasive pressure on Russian mothers following
World War II to have ten children. The Days (I9 64) point out that in Old
Testam,ent times high procreation was urged because of constant threats of
warfare from neighboring tribes, and this probably accounts for incorporation
of pro-natalism into Judaic religious belief which in turn influenced our
own philosophic heritage. On the other hand, the Days point out that Aristotle
was in favor of determining and maintaining ,an optimum population in order
that political processes operate smoothly. In post-war Japan, public realization
that exploding population would increase current poverty, which was resultant
from inadequate resources and land, underlay history's most dramatic example
of a voluntary cutting back, though not complete cessation of, population
growth. Birth rates and population growth rate was reduced by 50 % in 12
years. Perhaps the absence of strong religious taboos against contraception and
abortion made birth control rapidly acceptable in Japan.
In America subtle but powerful pressures impinge on the bearing of children. The notion that e'veryone should marry, without undue delay, and soon
thereafter produce children, preferably three to five, results from religious
traditions (actively pursued now only by Roman Catholicism and certain
Fundamentalist sects), from commerical pressures, and from the general tendency to conform with a cultural pattern. Also influential must be the presumption that population growth and prosperity are surely linked in this land
of unlimited riches. Up to now family planning programs have been aimed
only at individual problems where parents are producing more children than
they are able to cope with, from the standpoint of current living standards.
Contraception has been widely available to middle and upper' class couples;
family size for most Americans has been largely by choice rather than by
accident or ignorance. Only recently have citizens organized to plead for
family limitation throughout all of society as a means to save everyone's environment and living standards.
Given then the need for action, the question soon arises whether voluntary
efforts alone will suffice to stop growth or whether governmental intervention
is inevitable. To us this question is not terribly relevant right now. If, in the
U.S., a major segment of the influential public did not become convinced that
stability was vitally necessary, it is improbable that any subsidization or coer73

MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT
cion to curb births could be legislated. If, however, a majority did agree that
growth must stop, then birth rate would presumably already have begun to
drop through voluntary action. A stigma would be borne by couples who
subsequently opted for large families. At this point, if a minority continued
to disregard community efforts towards stability, public frustration and offendedness might well lead to legislation on family limitation. We do not
predLct that a minority would necessarily stand in irresponsible opposition,
but the kinds of rationale underlying governmental intervention of any sort
need to be discussed in considering all eventualities. Were changes in public
attitude not to arise soon enough or strongly enough to prevent this country's
population from rising to a point where individual dignity became severely
eroded, then the legal bases of personal freedom might surely be lost. With
such a loss, arbitrary and autocratic institutions would likely replace present
ones; then governing forces could choose the most direct mean.s of population
control without regard to personal sensitivities.
Before proceeding any further in discussions of population policy in America, certain ground rules must be reiterated, for the safeguarding of humanistic
principles and the essence of the American heritage of political and legal
equality. Any program intervening in the reproductive decisions of citizens at
large must be totally egalitarian. The slightest element of differentiation based
on race, political or religious belief, economic status, social class, or region of
residence would render the systen1 suspect of conspiratorial undertones. Birth
control aimed at the ce poor" may in some cases help both parents and children
to find a better quality of life and a better chance in the world, but limiting
population is a responsibility which falls equally on every citizen. In America,
where middle and upper classes predominate, it is those who can cafford"
large families who are currently contributing the greatest share of our growth.
Thus it is appropriate that a new organization, Zero Population Growth, Inc.,
uses the catch phrase, c«The population bomb is everybody's baby."
Next, it is imperative that the notion of an unwanted or unneeded birth
be refuted. While there continue to be plenty of unwanted and excess conceptions, when a child does join the community he shares equally the rights
and privileges of all men. In fact, in terms of the world's things, he has a
greater share than we, because we have already used up a fair portion of ours.
This dichotomy of values between conception and birth creates potential
difficulties; but then it is no more difficult than putting many other aspects
of democracy and equality to work.
We defer to the experts specific aspects of methods and personal motives
C
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in birth control, and recommend to you the book CCToo Many Americans" by
Lincoln and Alice Day (19 64) for a comprehensive, authoritative, and humanistic discussion. Suffice it here that we examine the broad roles of freedom
and responsibility in relation to achieving stability within a democratic community.
Education is obviously a key factor in prompting value change, and, in
the case of attitudes towards birth control, we face the somewhat delicate
problem of sex education for the pre-pubertal age levels. It would appear
unquestionably that all aspects of man's reproductive biology need be made
a more objective and unembarrassed topic of knowledge. Since one result of
sexual participation is the addition of new members to society, it is hard
to justify that the biology behind the event is too personal to handle in public
schools. While great strides are being made in curricula of many districts,
vitv.perative attacks upon sex education are currently frequent. If successful,
these attacks serve not only to impede basic education and man's ability to
understand himself, but also by hindering discussion of birth control impede
his solution of the environmental dilemma. On the other hand, we take
encouragement in the increasing openness of youngsters toward their sexuality.
Recognizing that hedonism and promiscuity, primarily as they disrupt the
environment of the developing child, are doubtless harmful to the fiber of
society, we are not aware that the levels of biological understanding are related to the degree which sexual pursuits can cause social problems, unless
there be a negative relationship.
In seeking the basis for a population ethic, we return to Boulding's use of
Polak's notion that a society's cohesiveness is related to its ability to identify
with others in space and through time. Continued increase of our numbers
can be viewed not nearly as much an affront to our own generation as to our
children's generation, and their children's, and so on. We who are presumptuous enough to bring even one new person onto the planet cannot, in good
conscience, shirk the responsibilities of providing at least as good an environment for him as we ourselves have inherited. If then it becomes obvious that
the world is now crowded, then we are shortchanging our progeny. This
puts family planning in the context of strong ethical obligation to those not
yet born. Persons who say, ((let the next generation decide for itself," ignore
the fact that only this generation can decide how crowded the next one will be.
Does precedent exist in American political ethics to support government
action in family-size limitation? We examine this in terms of the most benign
sort of intervention, but do not speculate on what forms might be proposed.
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exists to protect by law, if necessary, the interests of the majority in preventing
overpopulation.
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